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REPORT OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON JURISDICTION - PART 11*
ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMBERS: ALICE A. KIPEL; JUDITH A.
LEE; WILLIAM D. OUTMAN II; PATRICK C. REED (CHAIR AND
REPORTER); STUART P. SEIDEL; TERENCE P. STEWART; GEORGE
WEISE
EX OFFICIO OBSERVERS: BERNEICE A. BROWNE; LEO M. GORDON;
JAMES LYONS
INTRODUCTION
After considering the recommendations in Part I of the Report
of the U.S. Court of International Trade Advisory Committee on
Jurisdiction,' the members of the Court requested the Advisory
Committee to prepare legislative language to implement several
expansions and clarifications of the jurisdiction and procedures of
the Court of International Trade. The request encompassed the
following seven areas:
(1) Carlingswitch-type importer-initiated lawsuits (lawsuits
contesting voluntary tenders of duties);
(2) the standard of review in appeals to the Federal Circuit in
antidumping and countervailing duty cases;
(3) lawsuits contesting prospective Customs Service rulings;
This report is an advisory document addressed to the United States Court of
International Trade. The members of the Court subsequently requested preparation of a
further iteration of these proposals, combined with additional ideas developed in a paper
by John Donohue and John Peterson, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.75 (2003).
1 Report of the United States Court of International Trade Advisory Committee on
Jurisdiction - Part I, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 31 (2003) [hereinafter Advisory
Committee Report - Part 1].
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(4) Trayco-type importer-initiated lawsuits (lawsuits contesting
the finding of a violation underlying a mitigated penalty);
(5) customs penalty cases initiated by the government;
(6) customs seizures and forfeitures; and
(7) government lawsuits challenging state laws that violate
WTO rules.
The proposed legislative language is found under heading VIII
of this Report. Explanations of the proposed legislative language
are presented under headings I through VII.
I. CARLINGSWITCH-TYPE IMPORTER-INITIATED LAWSUITS
Carlingswitch-type cases, which take their name from two
lawsuits entitled Carlingswitch, Inc. v. United States,2 are
lawsuits seeking a recovery of amounts paid as a "voluntary
tender" of duties in a prior disclosure under 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (or
§ 1593A).3 In Carlingswitch J,4 the court held that a voluntary
tender is not a protestable decision and, in particular, is not a
"charge" or an "exaction" under 19 U.S.C. § 1514; therefore, there
can be no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). 5 Then, in
Carlingswitch 11,6 the court held that it lacks jurisdiction under
19 U.S.C. § 1581(i) because that subsection does not create any
cause of action.7
The Court asked the Advisory Committee on Jurisdiction to
review the definition of "exaction" and propose language that
would remove any possible constitutional cloud on the voluntary
disclosure statute. The possible constitutional cloud is that the
collection of taxes without any availability of judicial review
might be unconstitutional. By asking the Advisory Committee to
review the definition of "exaction," the Court's request seemed to
indicate that the Carlingswitch problem can or should be
2 85 Cust. Ct. 63 (1980), affd, 651 F.2d 768 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (Carlingswitch 1); 5 C.I.T
70, affd per curiam, 720 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Carlingswitch II). The progeny of
Carlingswitch include Tikal Distrib. Corp. v. United States, 21 C.I.T. 715 (1997).
3 See Advisory Committee Report - Part I, supra note 1, at notes 30-32 and
accompanying text.
4 85 Cust. Ct. 63 (1980), aff'd, 651 F.2d 768 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
5 See id., 85 Cust. Ct. at 65-68 (using dictionaries to define "exaction").
6 5 C.L.T 70, affd per curiam, 720 F.2d 656 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
7 See id. at 72 ("The notion 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) may in some manner be employed to
create a cause of action where none otherwise exists was rejected in Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 69 C.C.P.A. 96, 673 F.2d 1254 (1982)").
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resolved by making voluntary tenders of duty protestable under
19 U.S.C. § 1514. This approach would overrule Carlingswitch I
and allow the Court to exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1581(a), as opposed to providing a remedy that would be heard
under § 1581(i) jurisdiction, which would overrule Carlingswitch
II. Overruling Carlingswitch Iby amending 19 U.S.C. § 1514 has
the apparent advantage of being far simpler than overruling
Carlingswitch II, which would require creating the necessary
cause of action over which the Court would exercise jurisdiction
under § 1581(i).
The definition of "exaction" was explained at length in
Carlingswitch 18 and an earlier case, Alberta Gas Chemicals, Inc.
v. Blumenthal.9 In view of this established line of precedent,
modifying the established definition of "exaction" might well
create unforeseen problems. Nevertheless, to remain consistent
with the Court's idea of having voluntary tenders be protestable,
it is possible simply to add an additional subdivision of
protestable decisions in 19 U.S.C. § 1514 providing expressly for
protests against decisions as to "payments and assessments of
duties, taxes and fees, whether or not tendered voluntarily"
under §§ 592(c) and (d) and 593A(c) and (d).10 This is the
approach taken in the proposed legislative language set out
below.
II. APPELLATE REVIEW IN ANTIDUMPING AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES
The Court asked the Advisory Committee to study the
standard of review applied by the Federal Circuit in appeals from
the Court of International Trade and, if the Advisory Committee
8 See Carlingswitch, 85 Cust. Ct. at 66 (stating that "dictionary definitions make clear
that an 'exaction' is involved only where there is a demand for or the compelling of
payment").
9 82 Cust. Ct. 77, 81-82 (1979) (stating that "from a review of a long line of cases
involving 'charges' and 'exactions', it is obvious that these terms have been applied to
actual assessments of specific sums of money [other than ordinary customs duties] on
imported merchandise").
10 After the submission of this Report, the Court of International Trade issued its
decision in Brother International Corp. v. United States, 2264 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2003), in which the Court distinguished Carlingswitch and its progeny. The
Court held that, under the facts before it, the importer retained the right to file a protest
because the tender of duties was made in anticipation of the issuance of a penalty notice
and, therefore, was not truly voluntary.
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determined that there is a need for a clarification in the current
standard, to propose an appropriate clarification. The Advisory
Committee understood that the Court's request was concerned
with the standard of appellate review in antidumping and
countervailing duty cases. In these cases, the established rule is
that the Federal Circuit reapplies the statutory standard of
review applied by the Court of International Trade."
Since its role is advisory, the Advisory Committee did not
make a formal decision whether the standard of appellate review
in antidumping and countervailing duty cases should or should
not be clarified. Instead, the Advisory Committee concluded that
there are sound reasons for giving serious consideration to this
question and, therefore, prepared legislative language that would
serve as a basis for discussion. In evaluating the issue, the
Advisory Committee considered a memorandum that Wesley
Caine of the law firm of Stewart and Stewart prepared for the
Committee. A copy of this memorandum is attached as an
addendum to this report. Mr. Caine's memorandum provides a
thorough analysis of the reasons supporting a statutory
amendment that would relieve the Federal Circuit of the burden
of duplicating what the Court of International Trade has done
and, instead, would merely need to decide whether the Court of
International Trade misapprehended or grossly misapplied the
standard of review.12
The proposed legislative language set out below provides that
the Federal Circuit shall decide whether the Court of
International Trade misapprehended or grossly misapplied the
applicable standard of review and may also decide whether the
contested agency determination or conclusion is in accordance
with law. The Advisory Committee included the second clause of
11 See Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1559 n.10 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(interpreting 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)).
12 One committee member felt that, notwithstanding the stated appellate test of
applying anew the statutory standard of review in antidumping and countervailing duty
appeals, the Federal Circuit arguably does not always literally apply that standard anew
and duplicate the lower court's examination of the evidence supporting the agency's
decision. Instead, according to this committee member, what sometimes seems to happen
as a practical matter is that the Federal Circuit refrains from making a probing review of
the underlying evidence unless the appellant overcomes an unstated threshold burden of
persuading the appellate judges that the lower court's decision was egregiously wrong.
See, e.g., Avesta Sandvik Tube AB v. Trent Tube Div., 975 F.2d 807, 814-15 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (affirming the lower court's conclusion that the contested agency decision was
supported by substantial evidence without any detailed discussion of the evidence).
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the language to reflect that the proposed standard of review is
not intended to prevent the Federal Circuit from performing the
traditional appellate function of deciding issues of statutory
construction and other issues of law de novo.
III. LAWSUITS CONTESTING PROSPECTIVE
CUSTOMS SERVICE RULINGS
The Court requested the Advisory Committee to recommend an
amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) that would make it easier for
parties to obtain pre-importation judicial review of prospective
Customs Service rulings.' 3 This would require relaxing the
current standard, under which the plaintiff must show that it
would be irreparably harmed unless it is given an opportunity to
obtain judicial review prior to importation of the merchandise
that is the subject of the ruling. The Advisory Committee
considered two options for this purpose: a "good cause" standard
(option one in the proposed legislative language) and a
"commercially impracticable" standard (option two in the
proposed legislative language). The members of the Advisory
Committee felt that either of these options above would foster the
Committee's recommendation and, accordingly, the Committee is
submitting both options to the Court for its consideration.
Nevertheless, a slight preference was expressed for the "good
cause" standard.
IV. TRAYCO-TYPE IMPORTER-INITIATED LAWSUITS
Trayco, Inc. v. United States14 was an importer-initiated
lawsuit seeking recovery of an amount paid as a mitigated
penalty, based on the claim that the underlying finding of a
violation was erroneous. The Court requested the Advisory
Committee provide for concurrent jurisdiction shared by the
Court of International Trade, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims,
and (if the amount in controversy does not exceed $10,000) the
district courts.
13 See Advisory Committee Report - Part I, supra note 1, at notes 30-32 and
accompanying text.
14 994 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Advisory Committee Report- Part I, supra
note 1, at notes 10-12 & 28-31 and accompanying text.
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In Trayco, after ruling that the case was not within the
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade under 28 U.S.C. §
1581(i), the Federal Circuit held that the district court had
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) because the lawsuit was
"(1) a civil action; (2) against the United States; (3) in an amount
not exceeding $10,000.00...; and (4) founded upon an Act of
Congress - § 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930."15 The district courts
and U.S. Court of Federal Claims have concurrent jurisdiction if
the amount in controversy does not exceed $10,000, whereas the
Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction if the amount
in controversy exceeds $10,000.
The Federal Circuit's reasoning appears to create a broad class
of cases that are potentially covered by Trayco. Giving the Court
of International Trade concurrent jurisdiction in such cases
would probably need to extend that jurisdiction to "any civil
action founded upon any provision of the Tariff Act of 1930 or any
other Act of Congress contained in title 19, U.S. Code," other
than cases already within the jurisdiction of the Court of
International Trade. The language "contained in title 19," rather
than "codified in title 19," has been used because it has been
pointed out that title 19 is not one of the officially "codified" titles
of the United States Code.16
As an exception to this grant of jurisdiction, it is necessary to
exclude section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193017 from the
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade. Under section
337, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
jurisdiction to hear appeals from decisions of the U.S.
International Trade Commission, while certain collateral
litigation is within the jurisdiction of federal district courts. 18
Since the International Trade Commission's decisions under
section 337 are formal on-the-record adjudications, it is
appropriate for appeals to be heard at the appellate level, and the
Federal Circuit (and its predecessors) have exercised such
jurisdiction since the inception of section 337 (and its
15 Id. at 837.
16 The titles that have been "codified and enacted as positive law" are listed in the
Preface to the 1994 edition of the United States Code.
17 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2003).
18 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) & (f) (2003) (setting out procedures for judicial review,
counterclaims, injunctive relief and other judicial remedies).
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predecessors). The grant of jurisdiction to district courts in
certain collateral litigation under section 337 was part of a
delicately negotiated settlement to a GATT dispute that sought
to place importing interests on an equal footing with domestic
litigants in patent cases.
In addition to the requested legislative language establishing
concurrent jurisdiction, the Advisory Committee also drafted, for
the Court's reference, an alternative legislative proposal that
provides for exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of International
Trade. Some members of the Advisory Committee felt that
potential problems with concurrent jurisdiction might include
possible forum-shopping by the plaintiff, not necessarily making
more efficient use of judicial resources by increasing the caseload
of the Court of International Trade, and not assuring that the
customs and international trade statutes receive a uniform
interpretation by assigning all these cases to the same court.
The alternative proposal based on exclusive jurisdiction is found
at the end of the main legislative proposal set out below.
V. GOVERNMENT-INITIATED PENALTY CASES
The Court requested that all cases arising from civil penalties
under the customs and international trade statutes be heard in
the Court of International Trade. 19
As in the preceding provision, the term "contained in title 19"
has been used, and penalties under § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
are excluded for the reasons explained above.
VI. CUSTOMS SEIZURES AND FORFEITURES
The Court asked the Advisory Committee to propose language
that would, in essence, give the Court of International Trade
jurisdiction over all seizures by the Customs Service not covered
by the Civil Assets Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA) of 2000,20
other than narcotics and controlled substances. 21 In drafting the
proposal, the language "jurisdiction of any seizure," rather than
19 See Advisory Committee Report - Part I, supra note 1, at notes 19-27 and
accompanying text.
20 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2003).
21 See Advisory Committee Report - Part I, supra note 1, at notes 2-9 and
accompanying text.
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"jurisdiction of any civil action arising from a seizure," has been
used to make the language consistent with the grant of
jurisdiction to district courts in 28 U.S.C. § 1356,22 and the
language "contained in title 19" has been used for the reason
explained above (even though CAFRA says "codified in").
VII. ACTIONS CONTESTING STATE LAW WTO VIOLATIONS
The Court requested that it be given concurrent jurisdiction
with the district courts in actions by the United States under the
Uruguay Agreements Act contesting state law violations of any of
the international trade agreements administered under the
auspices of the World Trade Organization. 23
If the purpose of concurrent jurisdiction is to allow states the
option of defending cases in the local district court, and since the
forum is selected by the plaintiff United States, it might be
appropriate to allow the state defending such an action to have
an option to request a transfer of the case to the appropriate
district court.
As with the Trayco-type cases discussed above, an alternative
proposal providing for exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of
International Trade is provided for the Court's reference. Again,
the alternative proposal based on exclusive jurisdiction is found
at the end of the main legislative proposal set out below.
VIII. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Title 19, U.S. Code
§ 1514. Protest against decisions of the Customs Service
(a) Finality of decisions; return of papers. Except as
provided in subsection (b) of this §, § 1501 of this title (relating to
voluntary reliquidations), § 1516 of this title (relating to petitions
by domestic interested parties), § 1520 of this title (relating to
refunds and errors), decisions of the Customs Service, including
22 See generally Lefaivre v. United States, 478 F.2d 1400, 1400 (4th Cir. 1973)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1356).
23 See Advisory Committee Report - Part I, supra note 1, at notes 38-39 and
accompanying text.
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the legality of all orders and findings entering into the same, as
to -
(1) the appraised value of merchandise;
(2) the classification and rate and amount of duties chargeable;
(3) all charges or exactions of whatever character within the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Treasury;
(4) the exclusion of merchandise from entry or delivery or a
demand for redelivery to customs custody under any provision of
the customs laws, except a determination appealable under § 337
of this Act;
(5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry, or reconciliation
as to the issues contained therein, or any modification thereof;
(6) the refusal to pay a claim for drawback; e*
(7) the refusal to reliquidate an entry under § 520(c) of this Act;
Or
(8) the assessment or collection of duties. taxes. or fees.
whether or not voluntarily tendered. under § 592(c) or (d)
or § 593A(c) or (d) of this Act:
shall be final and conclusive upon all persons (including the
United States and any officer thereof) unless a protest is filed in
accordance with this §, or unless a civil action contesting the
denial of a protest, in whole or in part, is commenced in the
United States Court of International Trade in accordance with
chapter 169 of title 28 of the United States Code within the time
prescribed by § 2636 of that title. When a judgment or order of
the United States Court of International Trade has become final,
the papers transmitted shall be returned, together with a copy of
the judgment or order to the Customs Service, which shall take
action accordingly.
§ 1516a. Judicial review in countervailing duty and
antidumping duty proceedings
(b) Standards of review.
(1) Remedy.
The eoert United States Court of International Trade
shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion
found-
(A) in an action brought under subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of
paragraph (1) of subsection (1)(a) of this §, to be arbitrary,
20031
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capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law, or
(B) in an action brought under paragraph (2) of subsection (a)
of this §, to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record,
or otherwise not in accordance with law, or
(C) in an action brought under paragraph (1)(D) of subsection
(a) of this §, to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall decide whether the United States
Court of International Trade misapprehended or grossly
misapplied the applicable standard of review and may
also decide whether the contested agencv determination
or conclusion is in accordance with law.
Title 28, U.S. Code
§ 1581. Civil actions against the United States and
agencies and officers thereof
[Subsections (a) - (j) omitted]
[Option one for subsection (h)]
(h) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to review, prior to the
importation of the goods involved, a ruling issued by the
Secretary of the Treasury, or a refusal to issue or change such a
ruling, relating to classification, valuation, rate of duty, marking,
restricted merchandise, entry requirements, drawbacks, vessel
repairs, or similar matters, but only if the party commencing the
civil action demonstrates to the court that he would bc
r. eparably h.rMd unless there is -good cause for the
nartv to be given an opportunity to obtain judicial review prior
to such importation.
[Option two for subsection (h)]
(h) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to review, prior to the
importation of the goods involved, a ruling issued by the
Secretary of the Treasury, or a refusal to issue or change such a
ruling, relating to classification, valuation, rate of duty, marking,
restricted merchandise, entry requirements, drawbacks, vessel
repairs, or similar matters, but only if the party commencing the
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civil action demonstrates to the court that he would bc
irreparably harmed unless it wouldbe__coneJ~cjjl
impracti cable if the party wer-e not given an opportunity to
obtain judicial review prior to such importation.
(i) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of
International Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this § and subject to
the eweeptien exceptions set forth in subsection (j4 (k) of this §,
the Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of any civil action commenced against the United States, its
agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the United
States providing for -
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of
merchandise for reasons other than the raising of revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the
importation of merchandise for reasons other than the protection
of the public health or safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters
referred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection and
subsections (a)-(h) of this §.
This subsection shall not confer jurisdiction over an
antidumping or countervailing duty determination which is
reviewable either by the Court of International Trade under §
516A(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 or by a binational panel under
article 1904 of the North American Free Trade Agreement or the
United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement and § 516A(g) of
the Tariff Act of 1930.
(j) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the
Court of International Trade by subsections (a)-(i) of this §
and subject to the exceptions set forth in subsection 4 (k)
of this §, the Court of International Trade shall have
original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United States
Court of Federal Claims, and concurrent with the district
courts if the amount in controversy does not exceed
$10,000. of any civil action founded upon any provision of
the Tariff Act of 1930 or any other Act of Congress
contained in title 19, U.S. Code. This subsection shall not
confer jurisdiction over an antidumping or countervailing
duty determination which is reviewable either by the
Court of International Trade under § 516A(a) of the Tariff
2003]
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Act of 1930 or by a binational panel under article 1904 of
the North American Free Trade Agreement or the United
States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement and § 516A(g) of the
Tariff Act of 1930.
(4 W The Court of International Trade shall not have
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under § 305 or § 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930.
Sec. 1582. Civil actions commenced by the United States
(a) The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of any civil action which ariscz out of an import
transaction and which is commenced by the United States -
(1) to recover a civil penalty under § 592, 693A, 641(b)(6)
641(d)(2)(A), 704(i)(2), or 734(i) any Drovision of the Tariff
Act of 1930 (other than § 337 of such Act) or any other
provision of law contained in title 19, U.S. Code;
(2) to recover upon a bond relating to the importation of
merchandise required by the laws of the United States or by the
Secretary of the Treasury; or
(3) to recover customs duties;Dr
(4) to enforce a summons under § 510 of the Tariff Act of
1930.
(l) The Court of International Trade shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of any seizure by the U.S. Customs
Service, other than a seizure of narcotics or other
controlled substances, under (1) the Tariff Act of 1930 or
any other provision of law contained in title 19. U.S. Code.
(2) the Trading With the Enemy Act (50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1 et
seg.), or (3) § 1 of title VI of the Act of June 15, 1917, 40
Stat. 233 (22 U.S.C. § 401).
(c) The Court of International Trade shall have
original jurisdiction, concurrent with the district courts
of any civil action which is commenced by the United
States pursuant to § 102(b)(2) of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act.
Exclusive Jurisdiction Options for 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581 and 1582(c)
in Trayco and WTO Cases
§ 1581. Civil actions against the United States and
agencies and officers thereof
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[Subsections (a) - (h) omitted]
(i) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of
International Trade by subsections (a)-(h) of this § and subject to
the exeeptien exceptions set forth in subsection (j) of this §, the
Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
any civil action commenced against the United States, its
agencies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the United
States contained in title 19. U.S. Code. or providing for -
(1) revenue from imports or tonnage;
(2) tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of
merchandise for reasons other than the raising of revenue;
(3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the
importation of merchandise for reasons other than the protection
of the public health or safety; or
(4) administration and enforcement with respect to the matters
referred to in paragraphs (1)-(3) of this subsection, a-n3
subsections (a)-(h) of this §. and subsections (a) and (b) of §
1582 of this title.
This subsection shall not confer jurisdiction over an
antidumping or countervailing duty determination which is
reviewable either by the Court of International Trade under §
516A(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 or by a binational panel under
article 1904 of the North American Free Trade Agreement or the
United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement and § 516A(g) of
the Tariff Act of 1930.
(j) The Court of International Trade shall not have jurisdiction
of any civil action arising under § 305 o of the Tariff Act of
1930.
Sec. 1582. Civil actions commenced by the United States
[subsections (a) and (b) omitted]
(c) The Court of International Trade shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action which is
commenced by the United States pursuant to § 102(b)(2) of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.
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ADDENDUM:
BACKGROUND REPORT ON THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
IN ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY CASES
PREPARED BY WESLEY CAINE (STEWART & STEWART)
INTRODUCTION
The standard of appellate review in the Federal Circuit in
antidumping and countervailing duty cases has been the source
of controversy. In Atlantic Sugar, Ltd., v. United States,24 the
Court stated, without elaboration, that it reviews issues "anew"
in appeals from the Court of International Trade challenging
administrative trade-law determinations. This means that the
Federal Circuit essentially repeats the CIT's role, since it applies
the same standards of review prescribed in the statute for the
CIT.25 Circuit Judge Rader of the Federal Circuit strongly
criticized this redundant scheme in a well-known concurring
opinion in Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States,26 a case
involving the "substantial evidence" test. He opined that Atlantic
Sugar set forth an incorrect rule and that the Federal Circuit
should review the CIT, not the agency directly, and thereby play
a lesser role. Substantial controversy has ensued ever since.
Circuit Judge Rader makes a cogent case. His argument
should be limited, however, to the "substantial evidence" test. So
far as issues of law are concerned, there are good reasons for the
Federal Circuit to continue reviewing issues anew.
I. THE EXISTING SCHEME
The statute providing for judicial review of final AD/CVD
determinations requires that the CIT hold unlawful agency
action that is "unsupported by substantial evidence on the
record, or otherwise not in accordance with law."27 On its face,
this provision does not provide for any standard for appellate
24 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
25 See infra notes 29-31 & 37 and accompanying text.
26 99 F.3d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Rader, J., concurring).
27 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2003).
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review in appeals to the Federal Circuit. Nor does the statute
that provides for the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction. It simply
vests that Court with jurisdiction of appeals from final CIT
decisions. 28 Therefore, there is no statutory standard prescribing
an appellate standard of review. As stated, the Federal Circuit
filled this gap in Atlantic Sugar, supra, where it said in a
footnote, with no analysis, that it reviews the agency "anew. 29
This has become the leading pronouncement, with the Court
routinely citing the case. Relatively recent examples include
SKF USA Inc. v. United States,30 and F.LLI De Cecco Di Filippo
Fara S. Martino S.p.A. v. United States.31
So far as issues of law are concerned (as distinct from issues of
"substantial evidence") the Federal Circuit (like the CIT) applies
the Chevron formulation, i.e., the standards prescribed by the
Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.32 The Federal Circuit has described this as
follows:
In reviewing an agency's construction of a statute that it
administers, this court addresses two questions as required
by the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. The first question is
'whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.' If so, this court and the agency 'must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.'
If, however, Congress has not spoken directly on the issue,
this court addresses the second question of whether the
agency responsible for filling a gap in the statute has
rendered an interpretation that 'is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.' 33
28 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2003) ("appeal from a final decision of the United States
Court of International Trade").
29 See Atlantic Sugar, 744 F.2d at 1559 n.10 ("[w]e review that court's review of an
ITC determination by applying anew the statute's express judicial review standard").
30 263 F.3d 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001); accord, e.g., Eckstrom Indus. v. United
States, 254 F.3d 1068, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (stating that the Federal Circuit applies the
standard of review "anew" to rulings by the CIT).
31 216 F.3d 1027, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (stating that the court applies anew the
standard of review applied by CIT in its review of the administrative record).
32 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). See Pesquera Mares Australes v. United States, 266
F.3d 1372, 1379-82 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that Chevron continues to apply even under
the standards of United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)).
33 Shakeproof Assembly Components v. United States, 268 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (citations omitted).
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A reasonable construction is a permissible one.34
So far as issues of fact are concerned, the Federal Circuit
reviews the record to determine whether the agency's
determination is supported by "substantial evidence."35
"Substantial evidence" is "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,"' and
therefore 'more than a mere scintilla."' 36 To determine whether
such evidence exists, the Court reviews the record as a whole,
including all evidence that fairly detracts. 37 Again, in accordance
with Atlantic Sugar, the Federal Circuit does this "anew."
II. APPROPRIATENESS OF THE EXISTING
APPELLATE REVIEW STANDARDS
A. Issues of Law.
So far as issues of law are concerned, Atlantic Sugar appears
consistent with other Circuit Court decisions involving reviews of
administrative action under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Under that Act, "reviewing court[s]" hold unlawful agency
administrative action found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."38 In City
of New York v. Shalala,39 the Second Circuit applied this
provision in an appeal from a district court involving a challenge
to administrative action of the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS). The Second Circuit stated as follows: "On appeal
from a grant of summary judgment on an APA claim, we review
the administrative record de novo and render our own
independent judgment, according no deference to the district
34 See Torrington Company v. United States, 82 F.3d 1039, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(concluding that deference will be granted so long as the method of applying antidumping
laws is based on reasonable construction of the statutes).
35 See, e.g., Micron Technology, Inc. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1386, 1393 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (stating that that the determination will be upheld unless it is unsupported by
substantial evidence).
36 Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
37 See Micron Technology, 117 F.3d at 1393 (quoting Atlantic Sugar).
38 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2003) (to be distinguished from § 706(2)(E), which provides for
"substantial evidence" review).
39 34 F.3d 1161 (2d Cir. 1994).
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court's decision."40 Other Circuits apply the same basic rule for
purposes of 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). For example, the Seventh Circuit
said in Hanson v. Espy,41 "we need accord no deference to the
district court's disposition," in a case challenging action of the
Department of Agriculture. 42 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit said
in Sierra Club v. Davies,43 "IT]he district court opinion, therefore,
is afforded no deference," in a case challenging the Department of
the Interior. 44 The Fifth Circuit stated in Texas-Capital
Contractors, Inc. v. Abdnor,45 "we pay no special deference to the
decision of the district court," in a case challenging the Small
Business Administration.46
This rule of reviewing "anew" is logically consistent with
Chevron review. Such review, in its nature, focuses on the
administrative action, not on the trial court decision.47 Thus, in
the first step of Chevron review, the Court determines whether
Congress spoke directly to the issue at hand and it duly applies
the law if it did.48 It stands to reason that any Appellate Court
must independently make this determination. Certainly, that is
what the Supreme Court does when it reviews lower courts in
cases involving Chevron review, 49 and there is no reason in logic
or law for Circuit Courts to defer to their lower courts. The same
holds true for the second Chevron step. There, if the statute is
ambiguous or otherwise silent, the reviewing court must
determine whether the agency-not the lower court-reached a
permissible construction.5 0 This is a judgment for the Court on
appeal.D1 In one recent case, for example, the Supreme Court
directly disapproved an NLRB interpretation of a statute, saying
that the agency considered certain factors that had "nothing to
40 Id. at 1166; accord Ward v. Brown, 22 F.3d 516, 521 (2d Cir. 1994).
41 8 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1993).
42 Id. at 472.
43 955 F.2d 1188 (8th Cir. 1992).
44 Id. at 1192.
45 933 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1990).
46 Id. at 264.
47 See Shakeproof Assembly Components v. United States, 268 F.3d 1379, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (describing court's approach to reviewing an agency's construction of a statute).
48 See id. (quoting Chevron).
49 See id. (describing Chevron analysis).
50 See id. (explaining standard for judicial review of an agency's interpretation of a
statute).
51 See generally National Labor Relations Board v. Kentucky River Community Care,
Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
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do" with the statute's text.52 This, in turn, had nothing to do with
the lower court's treatment of the issue.
Therefore, Atlantic Sugar seems appropriate so far as
questions of law are concerned. There is no apparent reason why
the Federal Circuit should defer to the CIT on legal issues.
B. The Substantial Evidence Test.
In contrast, there are good reasons for a different conclusion
respecting the "substantial evidence" test. Circuit Judge Rader
discussed these reasons in his concurring opinion in Zenith.
First, the Judge stresses the language of the statute, which
sets forth the standards of review for AD/CVD determinations. 53
While the immediate language refers to "the court,"54 the context
makes clear that term refers specifically to the CIT. Therefore,
there is no requirement in the statute itself that the Federal
Circuit reviews "anew."
Second, the Judge cites Supreme Court authority applying the
"substantial evidence" test. He specifically quotes Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB,55 where that Court wrote as follows:
Our power to review the correctness of application of the
present standard ought seldom to be called into action.
Whether on the record as a whole there is substantial
evidence to support agency findings is a question, which
Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals
[In this case, the appeal from the NLRB was directly to the
Appellate Court.] This court [Supreme Court] will intervene
only in what ought to be the rare instance when the
{substantial evidence) standard [Circuit Judge Rader's
brackets] appears to have been misapprehended or grossly
misapplied.56 [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the Supreme Court gave weight to the lower court's
conclusions (which happened to be a Court of Appeals) in
applying the "substantial evidence" test. Circuit Judge Rader
analogized the case to Federal Circuit review of CIT decisions
52 See id. at 714 (suggesting that agency determinations go beyond the evidence
presented).
53 See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b) (2003).
54 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) (2003).
55 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
56 Id. at 490-91.
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involving administrative trade-law determinations. He wrote:
"This circuit court ought to employ the same judicial restraint
exhibited by the Supreme Court."57
Two points can be stressed. First, Chevron and Universal
Camera are both Supreme Court decisions dealing with review of
administrative action, and they prescribe different approaches to
review depending on the issue involved. Therefore, there is
sound basis for different approaches to appellate review of CIT
decisions in AD/CVD cases.
Second, Universal Camera remains good law. The Supreme
Court cited the decision, for the language quoted above, in, inter
alia, NLRB v. Baptist Hospital, Inc.,58 and American Textile
Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan.59 As the Court wrote
in American Textile:
Since the [Occupational Safety and Health] Act places
responsibility for determining substantial evidence questions
in the courts of appeals... we apply the familiar rule that
"[t]his Court will intervene only in what ought to be the rare
instance when the [substantial evidence] [Court's bracketed
insert] standard appears to have been misapprehended or
grossly misapplied" by the court below [quoting Universal
Camera].. .Therefore, our inquiry is not to determine
whether we, in the first instance, would find OSHA's
findings supported by substantial evidence. Instead we turn
to OSHA's findings and the record upon which they were
based to decide whether the Court of Appeals
"misapprehended or grossly misapplied" the substantial
evidence test.60
Finally, Circuit Judge Rader cites several decisions wherein,
he says, the Federal Circuit "has questioned either directly or by
implication the propriety of duplicating" the CIT's review. 61
These include, inter alia, Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas,
C.A. v. United States;62 American Permac, Inc. v. United States;63
57 Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States, 99 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(Rader, J., concurring).
58 442 U.S. 773, 794 (1979) (involving another NLRB review),
59 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
60 Id. at 523.
61 Zenith, 99 F.3d at 1582 (Rader, J., concurring).
62 44 F.3d 978, 982-83 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1994); See also Belton Indus. Inc. v. United
States, 6 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. den., 510 U.S. 1093 (1994).
63 831 F.2d 269 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. dis., 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
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and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States.64 These cases
are a clear indication of the Court's dissatisfaction with Atlantic
Sugar.65
Therefore, there is sound reason to re-examine the Federal
Circuit's Atlantic Sugar standard so far as the "substantial
evidence" test is concerned.
C. Statutory Solution
Notwithstanding its apparent discomfort, the Federal Circuit
apparently feels bound by Atlantic Sugar. Indeed, Circuit Judge
Rader expressly acknowledged that the case was the "court's
precedent" and that the Zenith majority "correctly applie[d]" it.66
There is, of course, a possibility that the Court en banc could
overrule it if it heard an appropriate case, but that eventuality
cannot be predicted. Therefore, if there is a general inclination to
modify the Atlantic Sugar rule, the only certain way to change it
would be by statute.
64 750 F.2d 927 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See Zenith, 99 F.3d at 1582 (Rader, J. concurring).
65 See also NEC Corp. v. United States, 151 F.3d 1361, 1374 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert.
den., 525 U.S. 1139 (1999) (giving Circuit Judge Rader's Zenith opinion a "but see"
citation when citing to Atlantic Sugar).
66 Zenith, 99 F.3d at 1579 (Rader, J., concurring).
